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Abstract
This paper analyses Turkey's performance in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).
The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section analyses FDI in Turkey
over time and relative to Central and Eastern Europe. The second section identifies the key
factors determining investment location and on the basis of these factors assesses Turkey's
competitive position. The third section examines the impact of EU enlargement on FDI in
Turkey and explores whether the IMF agreement is sufficient for reducing obstacles to
investment. The paper concludes that Turkey has under-performed in attracting FDI due
to the slow pace of privatisation and political-institutional obstacles, of which chronic
inflation is a manifestation. Structured interviews with global companies also highlighted
lack of investment promotion as a major obstacle. While the IMF agreement will increase
privatisation and reduce inflation, EU membership is vital if Turkey is to successfully
compete for foreign investment.
                                                
* Dr Henry Loewendahl (henry.loewendahl@uk.pwcglobal.com) is an analyst at
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ebru Ertugal-Loewendahl (iter.uk@virgin.net) is with the Institute
for Turkey-European Relations.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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1. Introduction and Executive Summary
1.1.  Introduction
Turkey is the largest economy in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea basin and the
Middle East. It is the European Union’s sixth biggest trading partner and the world’s 7
th
largest emerging economy.
Yet foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Turkey have rarely reached $1 billion in any
one year - a fraction the level of FDI attracted to countries of comparable size and
development like Argentina and Mexico and only one-quarter the level of FDI attracted
into Poland.
A World Bank survey of multinational companies’ perceptions of Central and Eastern
Europe as a location for FDI concluded that: “For Turkey there is no easy explanation; we
are left with the fact that investors speak more positively about it than the FDI inflows
would suggest” (Michalet, 1997: 4-5).
Academic research to date also provides little explanation for the low levels of FDI flows
into Turkey, or much analysis of FDI in Turkey in general. As Tatoglu and Glaister (2000:
5) state: “there is a paucity of information and study relating to FDI activity in Turkey.”
Several international and private sector bodies have argued that Turkey must attract more
FDI. The European Commission in its November 1999 progress report on Turkey
highlighted the poor performance of Turkey in attracting inward investment as a barrier to
economic development and integration. More outright, Inward Investment Europe argues
that: “To end its current recessionary cycle Turkey needs significant foreign direct
investment” (EUBIR, 2000).
The key objective of our study is to understand the extent of and reasons for Turkey’s low
level of inward FDI and to provide practical policy recommendations for increasing FDI in
Turkey. This study hopes to fill a major gap in research relating to FDI in Turkey.
It is a critical time for more research on Turkey due to two fundamental events in Turkey’s
economic and political landscape. First, is Turkey’s acceptance in December 1999 as a
candidate member of the European Union (EU). Second, is the far-reaching $4 billion
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). If successful, these events will
dramatically change Turkey’s investment climate. An important aspect of our study is
therefore to examine the possible impact of these changes on future FDI in Turkey.
1.2. Executive summary
†
In chapter two we evaluate Turkey’s performance in attracting FDI both over time and
relative to competitor locations. We find that FDI is playing a growing role in the Turkish
                                                
† Throughout the paper our main sources of primary research are data on FDI flows and projects
and structured interviews conducted from April-June 2000 with senior executives in thirty leading
multinational companies (MNCs) with investments in Turkey and global professional services firms
who advise MNCs on investment location.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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economy, in particular through new forms of investment, but that Turkey is under-
performing relative to Central and East European Countries (CEECs) in attracting FDI. A
key reason for Turkey’s overall under-performance is the minimal level of privatisation-
related FDI. In terms of mobile investment, Turkey has actually performed better than the
CEECs as a whole. However, compared to Turkey’s major competitors for investment we
find that Turkey has greatly under-performed in attracting both privatisation and mobile
FDI.
To understand why Turkey’s has under-performed, in chapter three we review the existing
literature to identify the key factors determining investment location, which we use to
evaluate Turkey’s competitive position for attracting FDI. We argue that the location of
FDI reflects the match of corporate strategy with three major location determinants:
economic; political-institutional; and enabling environment. We find significant evidence
that Turkey has a very strong competitive position in relation to the economic
determinants of investment location. Turkey is particularly well placed compared to
competitor locations due to its economic size and dynamism and quality of its labour force.
We find, though, that in terms of the political-institutional determinants of FDI location,
Turkey is in a much weaker competitive position. Political and economic instability,
manifested as chronic inflation, and negative government attitudes towards foreign
investors are major obstacles to FDI which are compounded by a weak enabling
environment for privatisation-related FDI and a total lack of effective investment
promotion.
In chapter four we explore the implications of the IMF agreement and EU enlargement for
future FDI in Turkey. We find that the IMF agreement and EU candidate status are vital
pre-conditions rather than advantages for attracting FDI into Turkey. Turkey will still face
many challenges to increasing FDI. In particular, competition for FDI is intensifying and
we argue that Turkey will face the erosion in its competitive position as a location for FDI
when the CEECs join the EU before Turkey. In our policy recommendations for
increasing FDI we argue that a vital pre-condition for Turkey to attract greater FDI is
greater political and economic stability in order to reduce inflation and make progress in
privatisation.
Turkey also needs to meet the requirements to join the EU, and we propose that Turkey
could join the Single European Market before it joins the EU, as this would remove many
obstacles to FDI. This argument also applies to other candidate countries that do not join
the EU in the first wave. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland are already attracting
the major share of FDI in the region and the prospect of their joining the EU first will
further widen economic disparities. We therefore recommend that the EU facilitates the
enlargement process as quickly as possible for Turkey and the CEECs
We also strongly recommend that a new investment promotion strategy is needed for
Turkey to develop its image, brand awareness, and provide much needed information to
investors at the national and regional levels.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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2. Turkey’s Foreign Direct Investment Performance
2.1. Introduction
The key objective of this chapter is to analyse Turkey’s performance in attracting FDI both
over time and relative to other countries. We are careful to compare Turkey with countries
that are actually competing for the same investment and we control for the different
economic size of countries to gain a more realistic measure of performance. We also
counter some of the limitations of traditional balance of payments FDI statistics by
separating out the role of privatisation in FDI flows and through using project-by-project
FDI data.
2.2. Turkey’s FDI performance over time
The stock of FDI in Turkey was only $300 million in 1971, and up until 1980 the average
annual inflow of FDI was only $90 million. As Balasubramanyam (1996) shows, this was
far less than other comparable countries, and FDI did not increase significantly for most of
the 1980s. It was only with a shift in Turkey from a protectionist trade regime to export-
oriented economic liberalisation in the mid-1980s that FDI increased significantly.
‡
As Figure 1 shows, annual FDI flows in Turkey grew rapidly from the mid-1980s, reaching
$1 billion in 1990. However, FDI flows per annum have not increased for the decade since
then. In other words, during the 1990s when global FDI flows accelerated – exceeding the
growth in world trade since 1989 – FDI in Turkey remained static. An interesting
observation in Figure 1 is the difference between approved and realised FDI. Approved
investment indicates what investors said they were going to invest, while realised
investment shows what they actually invested. For the last 20 years approved and realised
investment has been quite closely matched. The major exception is from 1995-97. It was
during this period that Turkey and the EU formed a customs union, which was associated
with a wave of new announcements of manufacturing investment in Turkey. However,
clearly investors’ perceptions of the opportunities afforded by investing in Turkey did not
meet the reality of the situation and most of the new investment was not realised. This
indicates that the government was unable to facilitate the large interest shown by inward
investors into real investment.
                                                
‡ Turkey was one of only 4 countries out of 24 OECD economies that on balance reduced
obstacles to trade over the 1980s - the other 3 were Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Wade, 1996:
69).LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey, 1980-2000, US$ million
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A different picture is presented, though, if we look at the number of FDI companies in
Turkey over time. From Figure 2, we can see that the number of foreign equity companies
**
has increased continuously since the mid-1980s. In fact, while the number of new
companies with foreign equity was around 300 per year from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s,
since 1995 this Figure has increased to almost 450 per annum.
In other words, while data on FDI flows shows FDI in Turkey to be static in the 1990s, the
number of companies with foreign capital is reaching record levels. In total, in early 2000
there were over 5,000 foreign equity companies in Turkey.
                                                
§ The GDFI informs us that FDI in petroleum and refining activities are not recorded in the FDI
figures. The cumulative FDI in this sector is $1.1 billion.
** Foreign equity companies are companies in Turkey recorded by the General Directorate of
Foreign Investment (GDFI) that have foreign capital. The GDFI screens all foreign investment.
Source: GDFI ( www.treasury.gov.tr ).
Total
$26.1 bn
Total
$12.5 bnTURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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Figure 2: Cumulative number of foreign equity companies in Turkey, 1980-2000
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If we look at the main sources of FDI using data supplied by the General Directorate of
Foreign Investment (GDFI),
†† we can see that European countries dominate FDI in
Turkey (Table 1). France and Germany are the major investors in Turkey in terms of
approved investment.
‡‡ In terms of the number of foreign equity companies, Germany is
by far the most important source of FDI - accounting for almost 18% of all projects in
Turkey.
Table 1: Main sources of FDI in Turkey, cumulative to March 2000
Country Approved
investment, US$m
Number of foreign equity
investment projects
France 5,364.78 243
Germany 3,487.14 897
US 3,028.38 316
Netherlands 2,972.69 316
Switzerland 2,001.55 198
UK 1,825.21 317
Italy 1,598.26 182
Japan 1,284.24 49
Other countries 4497,98 2,506
Total 26,060.4 5,024
Source: GDFI (www.treasury.gov.tr).
                                                
†† The GDFI is in charge of co-ordinating FDI in Turkey, reviewing projects submitted for
approval and actively encouraging such investment. It advises and assists investors with obtaining
necessary approvals and permits, searching for locations, and identifying Turkish partners and
projects. The GDFI also provides incentives.
‡‡ Because of the absence of a bilateral tax treaty until 1998 with the US, much U.S.-origin capital
has been invested in Turkey through third-country subsidiaries. By unofficial estimates the U.S. is
actually the largest source of foreign investment in Turkey. (US Department of State, 2000).
Source: GDFI (www.treasury.gov.tr)  *March 2000.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Table 2 shows the breakdown of FDI by sectors and sub-sectors. Manufacturing and
services dominate FDI in Turkey and there has not been much change in their share of
total FDI over time. The Table also shows the contribution of foreign capital in the total
capital of the foreign equity ventures for each sector. This gives us an accurate indicator of
the role of joint ventures in FDI in Turkey.
Table 2: Breakdown of actual FDI by sub-sector (1980-March 2000)
§§
Sector Number of projects
with foreign equity
% of total FDI % of FDI in total
capital of projects
Agriculture & Mining
Manufacturing
of which:
Food & Beverage
Tobacco
Textiles & garments
Chemicals
Plastics
Cement
Iron and Steel
Electrical machinery
Electronics
Automotive
Auto side industries
Services
of which:
Trade
Hotels
Communication
Financial services
Investment finance
Social services
TOTAL
186
1,251
146
10
220
165
52
9
15
69
72
28
102
3,587
1,949
279
14
37
47
216
5,024
1.3%
44.4%
5%
2.8%
2.2%
8%
2%
2.8%
1.9%
1.9%
1.7%
8%
2.9%
54.3%
9%
2.6%
1.7%
18.2%
4.5%
10.6%
100%
49%
50%
50%
91%
36%
79%
88%
46%
19%
65%
70%
45%
53%
63%
77%
61%
30%
75%
30%
77%
56%
Source: GDFI (www.treasury.gov.tr).
In the 5,024 foreign equity ventures, foreign capital accounted for 56% of the total.
Another way of looking at this is that FDI leveraged an additional 44% of domestic
investment, which shows the extent of joint ventures between foreign owned and Turkish
firms and the spill-over contribution of FDI to Turkey’s economy. In fact, up to half of all
foreign equity ventures have been joint ventures (Tatoglu and Glaister, 2000).
However, government investment agencies across the world only record joint ventures that
involve foreign capital, and therefore do not capture new forms of investment that have no
cross-border capital flows. To gain a more detailed picture of FDI in Turkey we monitored
FDI projects in Turkey in the first half of 2000 using media searches.
                                                
§§ This Table is derived from data in Turkish Lira. The data therefore does not show the true
market value of past FDI, especially given the rapid depreciation of the Lira.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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Table 3 shows 21 announced FDI projects, many of which will not be recorded in official
balance of payments data or by the GDFI. The projects range from expanding foreign
companies’ presence in the Turkish domestic market to facilitating access of Turkish firms
to overseas markets.
Perhaps the most significant examples are the joint venture between DuPont and Sabanci,
which expects to have $1 billion revenues from sales in Europe, Middle East and Africa
(EMEA) and the announced $1.5 billion German investment in a power station. In the
majority of cases the foreign companies are providing technology, market access and
know-how to their Turkish partners – key examples of new forms of investment. In fact,
we recorded only 3 greenfield projects.
The most important sector for projects is the information technology &
telecommunications (IT&T) sector, which attracted one-third of the projects we
monitored. This reflects the rapid growth of new economy activities in Turkey, in particular
mobile telecommunications, e-business, Internet, and banking.
*** The next most important
sectors were automotive and electronics.
While focus on FDI capital flows alone indicates that Turkey has become less successful in
attracting FDI over time, our analysis of the number of foreign equity companies, joint
ventures, and new forms of investment suggests that foreign companies are playing a major
role in the Turkish economy.
Table 3: FDI projects in Turkey in first half 2000
Foreign
investor
County Turkish
Partner
Type of FDI Sector Activity
EMC US Meteksan
Sistem
Strategic
partnership
Software Data infrastructure
products and services
in Turkey
Louis Dreyfus
Plastics
Corporation
US Ram (Koc
Holding)
Strategic
partnership
Trading Expand Ram’s
network in Russia,
CIS, Mediterranean
Balfour Beatty UK Garanti Koza
(Koc Holding)
49% ($12.4m)
acquisition
Construction Koza will be managed
on the basis of co-
ownership
Miller Brewing
Company
US Efes Beverages License
agreement
Food &
Drink
Produce "Miller
Genuine Draft" in
Turkey
France
Telecom and
Vivendi
(planned)
France Turk Telekom 20% ($4bn est.)
acquisition
Telecommun
ications
Strategic share in Turk
Telekom
                                                
*** Turkey has the fastest growing mobile phone, Internet, and IT markets in Europe. Mobile phone
penetration was 15 million by mid-2000, the IT market has being growing at 25-30% per year for
the last five years, 20 million people are expected to have Internet access by 2002, and one-quarter
of Turkey’s 2.5 million SMEs will have Internet access by 2001 (US Department of State, 2000).
Turkey’s young, technologically open population is driving demand and in the area of e-commerce
Turkey’s leading banks are amongst the most innovative in Europe.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Ritz-Carlton
Hotel
Company
US Suzer Group Strategic
partnership
Tourism To open Turkey’s first
five-star super deluxe
hotel
First Choice
Holidays
UK Ten Tours 100% (£77m)
acquisition
Holiday
travel
Expand European
presence
Vision Tech Israel Vestel Strategic
partnership
Information
technology
Supply technology for
Vestel’s new
generation TV
DuPont US Sabanci Joint venture Synthetic
materials
Export to EMEA
market. $1bn
revenues, 4500 jobs
Polgat
Company
Israel Guney Sanayii
(Baser Holding)
45%
acquisition
Textiles Access to US market
and knowledge
transfer
Microsoft,
Compaq,
Nortel
Networks
US and
Canada
Dogan Media
Group
Strategic
alliance
Internet Set up Internet
network.
Microsoft,
Hitachi and
Intel
US and
Japan
Vestel Strategic
alliance
Electronics
and IT
Rio Tinto Canada Anatolia
Minerals Ltd
Strategic
alliance ($0.5m
shares)
Mining Rio Tinto provide
$1.75m for metal
exploration
Foreign
investor
County Turkish
Partner
Type of FDI Sector Activity
Autoliv Sweden None Expansion Auto
components
$10m investment
LG S.
Korea
None Greenfield Electrical
Steag Germa
ny
None Greenfield Power
station
$1.5bn investment
planned
Daewoo
Trucks
S.Korea Sanko
Otomotiv
Licensing joint
venture
Automotive New plant in south
east Turkey producing
trucks
Scenix US Arcelik Strategic
alliance
Internet /
white goods
Develop and produce
internet
enabled household
appliance
Pixelpark
(Bertelsmann)
US Turport (Medya
Holding)
75% stake in
joint venture
e-business e-business strategy
support for Turkish
business
Toyota Japan Sabanci Increase share
in joint venture
Automotive Expansion of
automotive
production
Alba / Pace
Micro
Technology
    UK Vestel Strategic
alliance
Electronics
The role of FDI in leveraging domestic capital investment and anecdotal evidence on the
contribution of new forms of investment to the technology, know-how and market access
of Turkish firms suggests that FDI is making an important and growing contribution to the
competitiveness of the Turkish economy. In fact, foreign affiliates account for nearly 20%TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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of total research and development (R&D) expenditure in Turkey and for over 70% of
patent applications to the European Patent Office. This is higher than every other country
in the OECD except Iceland (OECD, 1999a; 1999b)
However, the importance of foreign investment in Turkey does not necessarily mean that
Turkey has performed as well as it should have in attracting FDI.
2.3. Turkey’s performance relative to competitor locations
In evaluating Turkey’s performance relative to other countries it is important that Turkey
should be compared with competitor locations for FDI. The FDI strategies of MNCs are
in most cases regionally specific (Thomsen, 2000; Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995) and often
geographical proximity at the sub-regional level is a key factor in investment location. It
therefore does not make sense to compare the performance of Turkey in attracting FDI
with Latin American or Asian countries as for most FDI projects they are simply not
competing with Turkey and the regional FDI environments are very different.
There are also major differences in national economies and FDI needs to be adjusted to
take into account these differences. For example, comparing FDI in Slovenia with FDI in
Russia would be meaningless unless we take into account the size of their respective
economies. As Thomsen (2000: 17) argues: “What matters for host developing countries is
how much investment they receive relative to the size of their economies. Market size is
the primary determinant of the global distribution of FDI flows.”
2.3.1. Competitor FDI locations
To understand Turkey’s key competitors for FDI, in our 30 interviews with senior MNC
executives we asked the question “Which countries is Turkey competing with as a location for
FDI?” As Figure 3 shows, over 70% of respondents thought Eastern Europe was a key
competitor for FDI in Turkey, followed by North Africa, Russia & CIS, and Greece. In
other words, Turkey is competing against countries in the main geographical regions it
borders and primarily with countries of a similar level of economic development. Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic were cited most often as the main East European
competitors to Turkey.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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The main exception is the Middle East – only 10% of respondents saw this region as a
competitor to Turkey. A key reason is the lack of economic integration and (related) poor
political relations with Turkey. Israel was the most frequently cited competitor country in
this region.
Asia and Latin America are not considered key competitors by 70-75% of our interview
respondents, which supports previous research that MNCs are adopting regional strategies.
Our interview respondents mentioned India, China, Brazil and Mexico as the main
competitors in these two regions. The recently announced Mexico-EU free trade area is
likely to improve the competitive position for FDI in Mexico vis-à-vis Turkey and the
CEECs.
Interestingly, West European countries, excluding Greece, were seen as competitors by
only 14% of respondents. This suggests that MNCs are:
•  Segmenting the European market into West and East, most likely due to different
levels of economic development (and also into North and South for activities such as
call centres and shared service centres, due to geographical and cultural differences).
•  Adopting a regional division of labour within Europe, with CEECs-Turkey
competing for manufacturing activities and West European countries competing for
high tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive activities. In fact, Portugal, Spain
and Italy were the only West European countries specifically mentioned as
competitors to Turkey – Portugal and Spain are the lowest cost locations in Western
Europe and Italy is more geographically proximate to Turkey and is one of Turkey’s
key competitors in several industries (textiles, ceramics, and footwear).
2.3.2. Performance in attracting FDI
Table 4 compares FDI in Turkey and its key competitor locations, using balance of
payments FDI data as provided by UNCTAD.
Figure 3: Turkey’s key competitors for FDI (% of respondents citing country)
%TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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Table 4: FDI in Turkey and 9 Competitor Locations, US$ million
1987-92
per
annum
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1993-9
% of
total
1993-9
Total
FDI/
GDP*
Poland 183 1715 1875 3659 4498 4908 6365 7500 30520 25.99% 19.25%
Russia na 1211 640 2016 2479 6638 2761 2861 18606 15.85% 6.73%
Hungary 675 2339 1146 4453 2275 2173 2036 1944 16366 13.94% 34.23%
Czech 533 653 869 2562 1428 1300 2720 5108 14640 12.47% 25.97%
Israel 187 429 432 1337 1382 1622 1850 2256 9308 7.93% 9.26%
Greece 938 977 981 1053 1058 984 700 900 6653 5.67% 5.51%
Turkey 578 636 608 885 722 805 940 783 5379 4.58% 2.71%
Romania 61 94 342 420 265 1215 2031 961 5328 4.54% 13.96%
Egypt 806 493 1256 596 637 888 1077 1500 6447 5.49% 7.79%
Slovakia 91 168 245 195 251 206 631 322 2018 1.72% 9.91%
Bulgaria 34 40 105 90 109 505 537 770 2156 1.84% 17.59%
Total 4086 8755 8499 17266 15104 21244 21648 24905 117421 100.00% 10.55%
Source: Derived from UNCTAD (2000; 1999); World Bank (2000) * 1998 GDP data.
We can see that Turkey was the fourth major destination for FDI from 1987-1992, but
only the 8
th major location from 1993-1999. The key reason for this change in position was
sustained growth of FDI in several CEECs and Israel.
††† Over this period, Poland attracted
nearly six times more FDI than Turkey. When adjusted for GDP Turkey is by far the worst
performing country. Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria were the
best performing countries. As a proportion of GDP, Hungary attracted almost 13 times
more FDI than Turkey from 1993-1999.
In fact, as Table 5 shows, Turkey has performed worse than every region in the world
relative to the size of its economy. In terms of per capita FDI, which takes into account
population size as a determinant of FDI (Bende-Nabende, 1999), Turkey has also
performed worse than almost every region in the world and far worse than its key
competitors. By 1996, Hungary had attracted 16 times more FDI per capita as Turkey and
more surprising is the fact that Africa attracted similar levels of FDI per capita as Turkey.
Table 5: The role of FDI in the key regions of the world
FDI inward stock/GDP (%)
1998
FDI inward stock/capita ($)
1996
World
Developed countries
Developing countries
Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
Developing Europe
Asia and the Pacific
West Asia
Central Asia
13.7
12.1
20
21.1
19.5
15.7
20.2
7.6
25.6
528
2425
194
86
660
347
150
259
71
                                                
††† The growth of FDI in Israel was primarily due to acquisitions of Israeli companies in the
information technology sector and large semiconductor fabrication projects.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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South, East and South-East Asia
Pacific
Central and Eastern Europe
Hungary
Czech Republic
Poland
Turkey
23.3
29.4
12.1
33.2
26.1
15.1
3.8
143
618
151
1490
537
339
92
Source: UNCTAD (1998).
2.3.3. Performance in attracting privatisation and independent FDI
To gain a more accurate picture of the comparative performance of Turkey in attracting
privatisation and independent FDI, we used data from the IFC and World Bank to separate
the two types of FDI. Table 6 compares FDI in Turkey with FDI in the CEECs. In terms
of total privatisation-related FDI, the CEECs attracted three times more than Turkey
relative to GDP. If we look at just independent FDI then Turkey has been more
successful.
Table 6. Total and independent FDI in Turkey and CEECs, 1988-1995
Total
FDI
Privatisation
related FDI
Independent FDI
(non-privatisation)
Privatisation/
GDP
Independent
FDI/ GDP
Turkey
CEECs
$7.6bn
$36bn
$1.2bn
$16.4bn
$6.4bn
$19.6bn
0.6%
1.9%
3.2%
2.3%
Source: Derived from: IFC (1997); World Bank Privatisation Database, GDFI.
However, around 60% of FDI in the CEECs has flowed into just three countries: Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic. If we compare Turkey to Hungary - the most successful
CEEC in attracting FDI – then it is clear that Turkey has greatly under-performed. Table 7
shows that relative to the size of their economies, Hungary has attracted over 20 times
more FDI than Turkey and still 6.5 times more FDI when extracting privatisation related
flows.
Table 7. Total and independent FDI in Turkey and Hungary, 1991-1997
Total
FDI
Privatisation
related FDI
Independent FDI
(non-privatisation)
FDI/GDP
1997
Independent
/ 1997 GDP
Turkey
Hungary
$7bn
$15bn
$1.2bn
$6.4bn
$5.8bn
$8.6bn
0.6%
14%
2.9%
18.8%
Source: Derived from GDFI, World Bank Privatisation Database, ITD.
To analyse in more detail how Turkey has performed in attracting mobile investment, we
monitored manufacturing FDI projects announced in the CEECs and Turkey in the first
half of 2000. We recorded 27 projects, which while capturing only a small proportion of
total projects, provides an indication of market trends and includes many of the more
important projects.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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Table 8 reinforces our previous analysis that Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland are the
major locations for mobile FDI projects. We can describe these three countries as first-tier
investment locations in the region. Slovakia, Turkey and Estonia represent second-tier
locations. It appears that these 6 countries account for almost all FDI projects in the
CEEC-Turkey region.
Table 8: Mobile investment projects announced in first half 2000*
Company Origin Sector Location Capital Jobs Short listed
countries
Nemak US/ Mexico Auto parts Czech R. $30m 200 Czech R., Hung.,
Pol., Slov.
ARN Norway Alum. Recycling Czech R. $12m 50
Foster Wheeler Italy Polypropylene Czech R.
Philips Holland Elec. Components Czech Rep. $600m 1,000
Mitsubishi Elec. Japan Auto electronics Czech Rep. $33m 280
Lanna Svets Sweden Metal manufact. Estonia
INCAP Finland Electronics Estonia
Plywood Finland Wood manufact. Estonia
Westcast/Linam
ar
Canada Auto parts Hungary 550 Hungary, Poland,
Czech R.
Motorola /
DBTd
US/Taiwan Mobile phone Hungary $80m CEECs (not
Turkey)
Taiho Kogyo Japan Auto parts Hungary
Jabil Circuits US Man. Services Hungary $80m 1000
Artesyn Tech.s US Telecom man. Hungary $20m 1,200
Nokia Finland Telcoms Hungary 500
Esmar Spain Elec. Components Hungary 250 Poland, Czech
Rep.
Visteon US Auto components Hungary $62m 150 All Europe
Audi Germany Diesel engines Hungary $330m 2000
Visteon US Auto components Hungary $18m
Tata India Software Hungary $100m 80
Delphi Calsonic US/Japan Auto components Hungary $80m
Samsung S. Korea Elec. Components Hungary $21m 500 Hungary, Poland
Timken US Machine tools Pol. & Rom. Eastern Europe
Toyota Japan Auto assembly Poland
Macalux Spain Auto parts Poland $15m 30 Pol., Hung., Ger.,
Czech R.
Fextronics Sweden Industrial Park Poland $25m 3 Eastern Europe
and CIS
Sapa Sweden Aluminium man. Poland
TRW US Auto components Poland 350 Czech., Slovenia,
Slov.,Pol.
Intel US Software Russia 500
VW / Porsche Germany Auto assembly Slovakia Slovakia, Portugal,
Poland
Bekaert Belgium Auto related Slovakia $14 Slov., Hung., Pol.,
Czech R.
VW Germany Auto components Slovakia $18m 400 Poland, Hungary
Osram (Siemens) Germany Lighting man. Slovakia $2.3mLOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Autoliv Sweden Auto components Turkey $10m
LG S. Korea Electrical Turkey
Steag Germany Power station Turkey $1.5bn
Source: news media. *capital, jobs and short listed countries are estimates.
Hungary is the most favoured location, accounting for almost half of the total projects we
recorded, followed by Poland. This is supported by comprehensive research by Ernst &
Young, which shows that Hungary and Poland were among the top locations for
manufacturing FDI projects in Europe from 1997-1999 (Figure 4).
If Turkey is to increase its share of FDI projects, it is important to understand Turkey’s
competitive position relative to first tier locations in the CEEC-Turkey region. At present,
Turkey is losing projects to Hungary and other countries. For example, Samsung’s $21
million, 500 job plant in Hungary (Table 8) is actually going to supply the Turkish market.
In many cases Turkey is simply not on the investment map. In the projects where we were
able to gain information on short-listed locations, Turkey was not once short-listed. This
finding is reinforced by our interview results, with 85% of respondents stating that Turkey
made the short list “not at all” or “to a minor extent.”
 ‡‡‡
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
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2.4. Conclusion
Foreign direct investment plays a major role in the Turkish economy. In fact, Turkey is
more dependent on foreign investors that most other countries for technological and
innovation activities. However, when compared to its main competitors for inward
                                                
‡‡‡ When companies make investment location decisions they often first make a “long list” of
potential locations based on whether the location meets broad requirements. They then reduce this
list to a “short list” of locations that meet the more specific requirements of the internationalisation
strategy and the particular project (Loewendahl, 2001).
Figure 4: Manufacturing FDI projects (new and expansions) in Europe,
January 1997-June 1999
*  Our estimates
Source: Ernst & Young EIM cited in Corporate Location (2000).TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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investment, which we identified to be primarily in Eastern Europe, Turkey has been less
successful in attracting FDI relative to the size of its economy and population. A key
reason is the minimal level of privatisation-related investment in Turkey.
When we compared Turkey with its main competitor countries for FDI in the CEECs,
Turkey’s performed far worse even when compensating for privatisation FDI. Even taking
into account the possible leverage on independent FDI of privatisation-related flows
(Sader, 1995), the present privatisation process in Turkey is unlikely to improve Turkey’s
long term performance in attracting FDI relative to its key competitors.
It is therefore essential to understand the key factors influencing the location of FDI and to
explain why Turkey has failed to attract the levels of FDI of its major competitors.
3. Explaining Turkey’s performance
3.1. Introduction
Turkey represents a paradox. According to Institutional Investor Americas (1999):
Turkey has many advantages to offer foreign investors: a domestic market of
64 million people, proximity to the huge markets of Europe, the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the Middle East and North Africa, low
labour costs, a well-educated managerial class, state-of-the art
telecommunications networks, and modern infrastructure. Foreign investors
can freely move capital goods, capital, profits, and dividends in and out of the
country, and have the same rights, exemptions, and privileges as Turkish
investors.”
Yet at the same time we found that Turkey has under-performed in attracting FDI. This
chapter aims to understand this paradox through first identifying the key location factors
influencing MNCs’ decision to invest in one country in preference to another, and second
use this analysis to evaluate Turkey’s competitive location position. We aim to highlight the
key obstacles to FDI in Turkey.
3.2. Key location factors in investment location decision making
The emphasis of most literature in international business studies is on theories explaining
why firms engage in FDI rather than where they locate. The literature, as represented by
Dunning’s (1977; 1988) OLI paradigm, does not explicitly consider how the firm decides
where to locate its investment. To explain investment location we need to understand the
motivation driving firms to invest overseas and why one location is selected in preference
to another.
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999b): “The company needs to find business
environments that reliably match a complex array of success factors unique to the
competitive strategy and specific project of the enterprise.” However, traditional
international business theories have tended to neglect considerations of corporate strategy
in investment location decisions (European Commission, 1998; Mucchielli, 1991). This is a
major short-coming as a country’s attractiveness for inward investment cannot be definedLOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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without reference to company investment strategies (Michalet, 1997: 23), with investment
location often dependent on the overall strategy of the firm (see Loewendahl, 1999 for the
case of Siemens).
Dunning (1998) has identified four generic types of strategic motives for international
investment: market, efficiency, resource, and asset seeking FDI. In terms of market
(horizontal) and efficiency (vertical) seeking investment, FDI reflects a trade-off between
proximity to market and economies of scale from concentrating production (Di Mauro,
1999; Markusen and Venables, 1996; Brainard, 1993).
The importance of market seeking FDI has been indicated in many empirical studies. FDI
flows have been shown to correlate with market size (Di Mauro, 1999; Bende-Nabende,
1999; UNCTAD, 1998; Mody and Wheeler, 1992) and firm-level surveys have also
emphasised the over-riding importance of market seeking motives (e.g. Michalet, 1997;
Commerzbank, 1997 cited in OECD, 1997; NEI, 1992; IBB, 1991).  Market seeking FDI
provides an explanation for the two-way investment between developed countries (see
Brenton, 1996 for a theoretical overview).
Efficiency seeking FDI stresses differences in factor costs, but many studies have shown
that FDI in developing countries is primarily market seeking (e.g. Estrin et al, 1997;
Agarwal, 1997; Yeung, 1996). Cost differences are only likely to play a critical role in
determining investment location when the investor needs to choose between short-listed
countries, which are likely to be part of the same, sub-regional market (Loewendahl, 2001).
Asset seeking FDI is the most recent motive for FDI to be identified. It refers to a strategy
that aims to access and exploit technological assets in overseas countries. Asset seeking
FDI is largely in the form of M&As and technology agreements, but there has also been in
recent years a rapid growth in overseas R&D investments. Developed countries are the
main recipients for R&D investment, but countries such as Hungary, India and Brazil are
also attracting more and more R&D projects.
§§§
                                                
§§§ See Loewendahl (2001) for a detailed analysis of asset seeking FDI.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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Table 9: Strategic and project determinants of country attractiveness for FDI
FDI determinants Corporate                       Key location factors in
strategy                           host country
Economic determinants
-  Economic liberalism (tariff and
non-tariff barriers; privatisation,
foreign exchange policy; taxation)
-  Performance (GDP growth,
inflation, government, internal and
external debt)
-  Long term strategy (adjustment and
stabilisation; local market, exports)
-  FDI track record
-  Factors in right side of Table
-  Telecommunications infrastructure
FDI enabling environment
-  Investment promotion
-  Investment facilitation
-  Investment incentives
-  Corruption and administrative costs
-  Property and site provision
-  Social amenities
-  After-care services
Political and institutional
-  Political system
-  Government attitude to foreign
investment
-  Tensions among socio-economic
groups
-  Law and Order: the judicial system
and dispute settlement
-  Rules of entry and operation
-  Policies on functioning and
structure of markets (especially
competition policy, mergers &
acquisitions, labour markets)
-  International agreement on FDI
-  Coherence of FDI and trade
policies
-  Cultural factors and quality of life
Market seeking        - Market size
                                   - Market growth
                                   - Access to regional or
                                     global markets
                                   - Country-specific
                                     consumer preferences
                                   - Structure of markets
                                   - Strength of indigenous
                                      business
Efficiency seeking     - Costs of resources and
                                      assets, adjusted for
                                      labour productivity
                                    - Other input costs, such
                                      as transport, and
                                      intermediate products
                                    - Membership of a
                                      regional integration area
                                      for economies of scale
Resource                   - Raw materials
seeking                      - Low cost, unskilled
                                     labour
Asset  seeking           - Skilled labour availability
                                   - Quality universities and
                                     research institutes
                                   - Large supply of
                                     graduate labour
                                   - Created assets including
                                     innovative capacity,
                                     technological adoption,
                                     marketing networks,
                                     technical skills, work
                                     and cultural attitudes,
                                     agglomeration
economies
                                   - clusters and critical mass
                                     in R&D and FDI
Source: Developed from PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999b); Moran (1999); Dunning (1998); UNCTAD
(1998); Michalet’s (1997); Christodoulou (1996).
These generic strategies cannot be taken in isolation from one another. There is a constant
trade-off in MNC location decision-making between proximity and concentration (Di
Mauro, 1999: 5), revenues and costs (Haigh et al cited in Thomsen and Woolcock, 1993:
38), and exports and selling locally (OECD, 1998a: 20). As argued by Michalet (1997: 11),LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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multinationals “more and more seek sites that offer both market access and conditions for
world-competitive production…Multinationals are using both strategies at the same time.”
In fact, we would argue that MNCs are increasingly making investment location decisions
based on a regional or global strategy that integrates market, efficiency, and asset seeking
motives. The ideal location should offer access to markets, an efficient production base,
and at the same time the technological assets that can contribute to the company’s network
of critical capabilities across the world.
Building on existing literature, Table 12 highlights the main generic determinants of FDI,
which we divide into economic, the enabling environment, and political institutional
factors, and key location factors specific to the particular internationalisation strategy of the
firm. We will use Table 9 as a template for evaluating Turkey’s competitive location
position in the next section.
3.3. Turkey’s competitive position
In this section we evaluate Turkey’s competitive position in meeting the requirements of
MNC strategy. We examine the attractiveness of Turkey for market, efficiency and asset
seeking FDI before assessing Turkey relative to competitor locations in meeting the
enabling environment and political-institutional determinants of FDI.
3.3.1 Attractiveness to multinational corporations
In our interviews with the senior executives we asked the question “As a location for market,
efficiency, and asset seeking FDI in what order would you rank Turkey and its main competitors for
investment?” We gained 19 complete responses that ranked Turkey against three CEECs and
Egypt. Table 10 shows the results.
We can see that Turkey is considered the most favourable location for market seeking FDI
by 53% of respondents, compared to 32% for the CEECs. In terms of efficiency seeking
FDI, 40% of respondents ranked Turkey first place compared to 60% of respondents
ranking the CEECs first place. Turkey and the CEECs were ranked equally as a location
for asset-seeking investment. Egypt was ranked as the least attractive location in every case.
Table 10: Rank of Turkey and key competitors as a location for market, efficiency
and asset seeking FDI (% of total respondents)
Rank first Rank second Rank third Country*
Market
seeking
Efficiency
Seeking
Asset
seeking
Market
Seeking
Efficiency
seeking
Asset
seeking
Market
seeking
Efficiency
seeking
Asset
seeking
Turkey
CEECs (3)
Egypt
53%
32%
15%
40%
60%
0%
50%
50%
0%
32%
47%
21%
47%
33%
20%
50%
50%
0%
16%
21%
63%
13%
7%
80%
0%
0%
50%
* CEECs (3) are Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
Our findings support an earlier study of 90 MNCs, which found Turkey to be the most
attractive location in the CEECs-Turkey-North Africa region for American firms and theTURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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second most attractive location for European firms for market seeking FDI (Table 11).
Turkey is ranked slightly less attractive as a location for efficiency seeking FDI
Table 11: Attractiveness of countries as seen by European and US firms
European firms American firms
Market seeking Efficiency seeking Market seeking Efficiency seeking
Portugal
Poland
Turkey
Hungary
Russia
Slovakia
Egypt
Morocco
Ukraine
Tunisia
Lithuania
Poland
Turkey
Portugal
Hungary
Russia
Slovakia
Lithuania
Ukraine
Egypt
Morocco
Tunisia
Turkey
Hungary
Poland
Russia
Portugal
Egypt
Ukraine
Morocco
Tunisia
Slovakia
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Turkey
Portugal
Russia
Egpyt
Ukraine
Tunisia
Morocco
Lithuania
Slovakia
Source: Michalet (1997).
Overall, based on the perceptions of MNCs we would expect Turkey to have attracted
similar levels of FDI to the leading locations in Central and Eastern Europe.
3.3.2. Key location advantages for market seeking FDI
To assess Turkey’s location advantages for market seeking investment we compared
Turkey’s market size and performance with 11 other countries, including Turkey’s main
regional competitors for FDI and Latin American and East Asian emerging countries.
Table 12 shows that Turkey is among the largest emerging markets in the world.
****
Table 12: The Market size of Turkey and 11 other countries in 1998
Size of GNP (billions) 1998 GNP per capita (1998) Country
US$ US$ PPP US$ US$ PPP
Population size
(millions) 1998
Brazil
Mexico
South Korea
Turkey*
Poland
Thailand
South Africa
Iran
Malaysia
Egypt
Czech Rep.
Hungary
758.0
380.9
369.9
200.5
150.8
134.4
119.0
109.6
79.8
79.2
51.8
45.6
1,021.4
785.8
569.3
404
260.7
357.1
288.7
-
155.1
192.5
108¹
73¹
4,570
3,970
7,970
3,160
3,900
2,200
2,880
1,770
3,600
1,290
5,040
4,510
6,160
8,190
12,270
6,470
6,740
5,840
6,990
5,690¹
6,990
3,130
10,380¹
6,970¹
166
96
46
63
39
61
41
62
22
61
10
10
                                                
**** Turkey’s GNP and per capita income are underestimated. According to the US Department of
State (2000), the private sector contributes to an “unregistered” economy, which increases GNP by
up to 50%. A recent study has attempted to calculate a more accurate picture of incomes in Turkey
taking into account the informal economy. The study concluded that of the 63 million people living
in Turkey, income per capita of 15 million people is $15,000 (Le Figaro, 2000).LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Source: World Bank (2000; 1999), *PPP data is GDP 1997, ¹1997.
Table 13 shows an impressive economic performance in Turkey over time and that it is
perhaps the most successful example of export-led industrialisation outside of East Asia.
Table 13: Trends in economic performance of Turkey and 11 other emerging
                   markets
Average annual GDP
growth
Average annual
manufacturing growth
Average annual growth in exports Country
1980-1990 1990-1998 1980-1990 1990-1998 1980-1990 1990-97
South Korea
Thailand
Turkey
Egypt
Malaysia
Brazil
Poland
Czech Rep.
Iran
Hungary
Mexico
South Africa
9.4
7.6
5.4
5.4
5.3
2.7
2.2
1.7
1.7
1.3
1.1
1.0
6.1
5.7
4.2
4.2
7.4
3.2
4.6
0.9
3.6
0.5
2.5
1.9
13.0
9.5
7.9
-
8.9
1.6
-1.5
-
4.5
-
1.5
1.1
6.9
7.7
5.9
5.3
10.1
2.5
3.5
-
4.9
6.5
3.6
1.1
14.9
14.1
14.2
-3.7
8.6
5.1
1.4
-
1.1
1.2
6.3
0.7
12.3
14.9
11.2
4.3
16.8
8.2
11
-
1.6
6.2
20.5
4.4
Source: World Bank (2000).
The prospects for “tremendous growth” in Turkey’s economy led to its designation by the
U.S. Department of Commerce as one of the world’s ten “Big Emerging Markets” (US
Department of State, 2000). The UK Government’s Export Forum has singled out Turkey
as being one of the 12 international markets that offered significant trade and investment
opportunities for British firms (DTI, 1999). In fact, the Turkish government forecasts
Turkey’s per capita income to reach $20,000 by 2020, making Turkey the 10
th biggest
economy in the world.
†††† While this is based on a scenario of 6-7% growth per annum, it
appears to be shared not only by the US and British governments but also by major private
sector organisations. ING Barings (1999), for example, has forecast Turkey to converge to
the average of 3 lowest income countries in the EU in about 25 years – before most of the
other 12 candidates to join the EU.
In terms of market seeking investment, we can conclude that Turkey has the strongest
competitive position as a location for FDI in its region due to the combination of large and
dynamic economy and large population with mid-level per capita incomes.
‡‡‡‡ Turkey can in
fact be considered a converging rather than an emerging market.
                                                
†††† The South Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) will increase regional per capita income in the South
East of Turkey by almost 3 times and generate job opportunities for 3.3 million people. The
estimated cost of GAP is $32 billion, of which 43% of total investment has been realised so far
(Kiminvest, 2000).
‡‡‡‡ Empirical studies examining foreign firms investing in Turkey have found market-seeking
factors to be the dominant motivation. Erdilek (1982) and Demirbag et al. (1995) from surveys of
93 foreign firms in Turkey found meeting domestic demand were the key reasons for investing.
Tatoglu and Glaister (2000), in a more recent survey of 98 foreign firms, found the most important
strategic motives for FDI in Turkey were to gain access to new markets and to enable faster marketTURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
21
3.3.3. Key location advantages for efficiency seeking FDI
Key location factors for efficiency seeking investment include labour costs, skills and
availability, and access to international markets (Table 9). In terms of labour costs and
productivity, Table 14 shows that Turkey has higher costs than the CEECs but much
higher labour productivity.
The Turkish workforce has gained a reputation as being productive, flexible, and hard
working.
§§§§ According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999a: 26): “Turkey offers a dynamic
and challenging business environment in a rapidly changing marketplace…The Workforce
is highly motivated, disciplined and trainable.”
Table 14: Labour costs and productivity in manufacturing, 1990-94, US$ per year*
Country Labour cost per worker in
manufacturing
Value added per worker in
manufacturing
Turkey
Hungary
Czech Republic
Poland
Greece
Ireland
Romania
7,958
2,777
1,876
1,714
15,899
25,414
1,190
32,961
6,106  (11,226)
5,094  (8,225)
7,637  (9,034)
30,429
86,036
3,482  (3,808)
Source: Derived from World Bank (2000); Eurostat (1999); UNIDO (1999) *data in brackets is for 1997.
Using survey data from the IMD, Table 15 compares in more detail the qualitative
attributes of the Turkish labour force that are often key location factors for efficiency
seeking FDI and for many types of investment project. We ranked Turkey with Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland (its three major competitors for inward investment), Ireland
(which has been highly successful in attracting inward investment), and Russia (which has
been unsuccessful – see Bergsman et al, 2000). We also compare Turkey with Greece (a
geographically proximate location).
Table 15: Benchmarking the quality of Labour in Turkey (rank out of 47 countries)*
Turkey Hungary Ireland Greece Poland Czech Rep. Russia
Labour regulations are
flexible enough
11 5 1 53 21 7 1 9 2 3
Competent senior
managers are available in
your country
8 31 11 33 40 46 47
Management has
significant international
experience
12 3 0 72 84 0 4 6 3 7
                                                                                                                                              
access. They found market size and the growth rate of the economy to be key location factors
influencing investment in Turkey.
§§§§ The latest data from the International Labour Organisation shows that Turkish people are the
second most hardworking in the world.  Nearly 90% of Turkish men and 80% of Turkish women
work for more than 40 hours a week.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Qualified engineers are
available in your country
13 1 21 16 26 33 43
Qualified IT employees
are available in your
country
12 2 2 12 51 6 3 1 3 6
Total 56 69 75 134 139 175 186
Average score 11.2 13.8 15 26.8 27.8 35 37.2
Source: Derived from IMD, 2000. * The IMD surveyed 3,263 senior managers in 47 countries. Rank 1 is best
in the world. Rank 47 is worst.
The results are perhaps surprising, with Turkey ranking above all the countries. Only
Hungary and Ireland are close to matching Turkey’s labour quality. Turkey is among the
top 13 locations in the world on every criterion. This was supported in our interviews, with
45% of respondents stating that the skilled and educated workforce was a key strength of
Turkey as an investment location (see SWOT analysis in the Appendix).
Efficiency seeking, export-oriented investment strategies depend on access to an integrated
regional market. According to the OECD (1998a: 26), regional integration can lead to
horizontal reorganisation (each country producing a different version of a product) and
vertical reorganisation (each country responsible for one stage of production). In both
cases, FDI should be encouraged (see Bende-Nabende, 1999; Di Mauro, 1999; Brenton,
1999; EC, 1998: 142).
In 1996 a customs union between Turkey and the EU came into effect, which led to
protection for EU countries falling from 5.9% to zero for most products and 3
rd country
protection for industrial products falling from 10.8% to 6%.  For firms with a market-
seeking strategy, the customs union should in theory encourage local production by 3
rd
countries (like the US and Japan) due to the increased competitiveness of EU products.
For firms with an efficiency-seeking strategy inside the European market, Turkey is the
only non-EU member to have a customs union with the EU. With manufacturing labour
costs in Turkey half the level of Greece and Portugal and one-quarter the level of
Germany, in theory the customs union should encourage FDI with Turkey becoming a
production base for exporting to the rest of the EU. As Tatoglu and Glaister (2000: 4)
argue: “It is expected that the customs union with the EU will spur the flow of European
FDI to Turkey.”
According to Michalet’s (1997: 14): “The ideal core country is one that offers at the same
time a large enough domestic market to justify an industrial investment, and a launching
pad into a regional market.” Our analysis of Turkey’s competitive position suggests Turkey
perfectly meets the requirements for an ideal core country.
3.3.4. Key location advantages for asset seeking FDI
Essential to asset-seeking investment is the engineering and science supply-side factors of
the economy, and increasingly the telecommunications and Internet infrastructure. Table
16 compares key location factors in Turkey and 7 other countries. While Turkey has among
the highest proportion of science and engineering students, patent applications and R&D
expenditures are lower than many competitor locations. Turkey is clearly a long way behind
Ireland in terms of its location advantages for asset-seeking FDI and is just about in theTURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
23
same group as Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, but is in danger of falling behind if
the technology infrastructure is not improved. Table 16 also gives clear evidence why our
interview respondents ranked Egypt last place as a location for asset-seeking FDI.
*****
Table 16: Engineering and science indicators, 1987-97
Country Science and engineering
students, % of total
tertiary students
Patent applications filed
by non-residents
R&D expenditure,
% of GNP
Russia
Turkey
Hungary
Ireland
Czech Republic
Poland
Greece
Egypt
50
45
32
31
28
28
26
12
32,943
27,985
29,331
82,484
29,976
30,137
82,390
706
0.88
0.45
0.68
1.61
1.20
0.77
0.47
0.22
Source: World Bank (2000).
3.3.5. FDI enabling environment
A favourable FDI “enabling environment” is a pre-condition for attracting inward
investment (UNCAD, 1999). The FDI enabling environment involves the facilitation and
support a location gives to inwardly investing companies. It has several components
including FDI legislation and procedures, attitudes towards foreign investment, incentives,
and investment promotion.
According to the US Department of Commerce: “Bureaucratic procedures related to the
establishment of a foreign investment are, in general, streamlined and transparent. Turkey’s
foreign investment regime is among the most liberal in OECD countries” (US Department
of State, 2000). An indicator of the height of administrative barriers to FDI is the ratio of
implemented to approved investments. Investor-friendly countries target realisation rates
of 60%-70%, and Singapore claims 80%. At the lower end of the range, it can be 15%-30%
(IFC, 1997: 40). Turkey’s realisation ratio is nearly 50% (derived from Figure 1), which is
about average.
Turkey’s incentives regime is also one of the most attractive on paper in the world.
††††† In
1995, the government announced an incentives package designed to attract investors to 20
                                                
***** Turkey’s telecommunications infrastructure is closer to West European levels, with
digitalisation higher than some EU members (Loewendahl, 1998) and off-peak Internet costs the
lowest in the OECD (Economist, 2000)
††††† In fact, we would agree with Balasubramanyam (1996: 126) who argues that Turkey’s incentives
and free zone may be much too generous. Kaminski and Riboud (1999: 32) find that companies in
free zones do not have any incentive to develop linkages with rest of economy and may be more
footloose. UNCTAD (1998: 145) supports this argument, finding that  “FDI in tax havens or FDI
made in response to incentives is particularly vulnerable to divestment” and the OECD (1998a: 56)
states that up to 95% of inputs of foreign firms in free zones in South East Asia are imported. It is
unclear what the impact of free zones is on long term competitiveness (UNCTAD, 1999: 237;
Hines, 1996), and Hungary and Poland are both reducing incentives and curtailing free zones.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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industrial belts across the country. The package includes grants of up to 70% of total fixed
investment, customs duties and fund exemptions, VAT refunds and subsidised credits up
to 40% (www.treasury.gov.tr/english/ybsweb/incentives.html). Turkey also has 17 free
zones offering very generous incentives (see
www.treasury.gov.tr/english/ybsweb/freezones.html).
Although Turkey has one of the world’s most liberal foreign investment laws and attractive
incentive regimes, the enabling environment for privatisation and infrastructure-related
foreign investors has been very weak. A key obstacle has been the lack of international
arbitration, which deterred such investment, especially in big public projects (Euromoney,
2000; Middle East Economic Digest, 1999; Institutional Investor Americas, 1999).  This is
supported by our interview results with over 50% of respondents citing legislation,
regulation and bureaucracy and nearly 30% citing the slow pace of reform and political
resistance as the major factors explaining Turkey’s under-performance in attracting
country-specific infrastructure and privatisation-related FDI.
To evaluate Turkey overall enabling environment in comparison with other investment
locations, Table 19 draws on survey evidence from the IMD. On almost every criteria
Turkey ranks above average out of 47 developed and emerging economies. Turkey’s FDI
enabling environment is only narrowly behind that of Greece and Hungary and is perceived
to be far more favourable than the Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. In fact, Russia and
Poland are among the worst performing countries out of the 47 in the IMD sample.
Table 19: FDI enabling environment (ranking out of 47 countries)
Ireland Hungary Greece Turkey Czech
Rep.
Poland Russia
Protectionism does not prevent
import of foreign products
52 41 414 18 38 46
Foreign investors are free to
acquire control in a domestic
company
2 14 15 17 20 38 46
Foreign companies are treated
equally to domestic
63 41 514 36 45 47
Public sector contracts are open
to foreign bidders
2 18 22 15 27 34 47
Cross border ventures can be
negotiated with foreign partners
without government
31 21 524 27 43 45
Investment protection schemes
are available for foreign partner
countries
14 1 12 18 24 34 47
Investment incentives are
attractive to foreign investors
15 2 9 19 36 15 47
National culture is open to
foreign influence
9 20 19 28 42 29 30
Immigration laws do not prevent
employment of foreign labour
28 11 12 15 22 41 44
Total 70 139 153 164 252 317 399
Score 7.8 15.4 17.0 18.2 28.0 35.2 44.3
Source: Derived from IMD, 2000.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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Another dimension of facilitating FDI is investment promotion. In our interviews, 85% of
respondents when asked whether Turkey’s has effective promotion replied “not at all” or
“to a minor degree.” Half of respondents said that the GDFI needs to be able to provide
very specific, investor-related information. Similarly, almost 60% of respondents stated that
there was not adequate information on Turkey. Of these, 70% said they would like more
general information and 20% said they would like information on regional differences.
‡‡‡‡‡
It is therefore not surprising over 60% of respondents when asked if Turkey has an
effective image replied “not at all” or “to a minor degree.”
3.3.6. Political-institutional environment
According to Michalet (1997): “an indispensable precondition for encouraging foreign
investment is to have a stable political and economic climate, and a transparent and non-
discretionary legal and regulatory framework.” We found strong support for this argument
in case of Turkey. In our interviews, political instability was cited by over 70% of
respondents and economic instability by 50% as key factors reducing the level of
independent FDI in Turkey. Legislation and bureaucracy was also a thought to be a key
factor reducing FDI in Turkey according to almost 35% of respondents. This is despite the
liberal FDI regime and broadly effective facilitation by the GDFI. Key factors identified in
our interviews included political interference in FDI facilitation, weak justice system,
corruption, and the inadequate enforcement of competition law and intellectual property
rights. Several respondents also noted that investors’ generally think the Turkish
government does not view FDI favourable and mistrusts foreign companies and foreigners
in general.
Our interview evidence is supported by the IMD, which found Turkey to have a very poor
institutional environment when measured across 8 dimensions. Table 19 shows that Turkey
ranks behind Hungary and Poland, but is still ranked slightly above the Czech Republic and
Russia. The contrast with Ireland is clear.
Turkey performs particularly badly in terms of political instability and exchange rate
stability. Turkey’s political instability can be seen by the fact that Turkey has had 11
governments in the past 10 years. However, Poland, has had 9 government in the last 9
years but has still been successful in attracting FDI. Political instability is not a constraint to
attracting FDI unless it prevents structural reform and reduces markedly policy certainty.
In Turkey, political instability has had a major impact on macro-economic instability, with
the lack of structural economic reform leading to chronic inflation and exchange rate
instability (Loewendahl, 1998). In Poland, political instability has not proved to be an
obstacle to structural reform, with the reduction in inflation from 35.3% in 1993 to 14.9%
in 1997 and simultaneous reduction in debt coinciding with a rapid growth in FDI and
other capital inflows (see Orlowski and Szczepanska-Maciejuk, 1998)
                                                
‡‡‡‡‡ According to one respondent: “We [Turkey] need to create new promotional agencies at the
regional and national levels. They should focus on specific sectors and companies that may have
interest in Turkey through aggressive marketing and promotion. Regions should market themselves
separately, while the national government promotes Turkey in general”.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Table 19: Institutional environment (ranking out of 47 countries)
Ireland Hungary Greece Poland Turkey Czech
Rep.
Russia
Exchange rate stability 21 39 34 40 43 17 -
The public service is
immune from political
interference
7 29 41 24 35 38 27
Bureaucracy does not
hinder business
development
52 04 12 627 34 47
Customs administration
does not hinder transit of
goods
6 30 25 35 32 33 43
Bribing and corruption
does not exist in public
17 28 36 30 33 41 40
Competition laws do not
prevent unfair competition
9 24 37 44 36 40 47
Justice is fairly administered
in society
10 23 26 37 34 41 45
Risk of political instability is
very low
7 19 20 41 43 42 47
Total 82 212 260 277 283 286 296
Score 10.25 26.5 32.5 34.625 35.375 35.75 37
Source: Derived from IMD (2000).
Turkey’s chronic inflation is a key factor explaining why Turkey has under-performed.
According to Institutional Investor Americas (1999), “high inflation and past political
instability has kept foreign investors away” and the IMD (2000: 24) argues that “Turkey’s
competitiveness is held back by the unusually high inflation rate of 65%, which prevents
the country to fully exploit its formidable potential.”
3.4. Conclusion
In this chapter we argued that investment location is determined by firm strategy and
identified the key location factors for different strategies, which we used to evaluate
Turkey’s competitive position relative to other countries.
We found powerful evidence from our empirical data and interviews that in meeting the
economic determinants for market and efficiency seeking FDI, Turkey’s competitive
position is very strong. Turkey combines a large, dynamic market with a high quality, high
productivity labour force and access to regional markets. In addition, we found Turkey’s
FDI enabling environment to be largely favourable for independent investment when
compared to competitor locations, although Turkey’s investment promotion is totally
inadequate. Overall, when we combine Turkey’s economic location advantages with liberal
FDI regulations and attractive incentives, we would expect high levels of FDI in Turkey.
However, we found that Turkey’s FDI enabling environment was far weaker for
privatisation-related and infrastructure investment and our competitive assessment of
political-institutional factors identified many obstacles to FDI in Turkey. Table 20
summarises Turkey’s competitive position in meeting the location requirements for FDI.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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Table 20: Turkey’s location advantages for FDI
Key location factors Competitive position
Market seeking FDI
Economic size
Economic growth
Population size
Per capita incomes
Efficiency seeking FDI
Labour costs
Labour productivity
Regional integration zone
Labour skills and supply
Asset seeking FDI
Supply of engineers and technicians
R&D and innovation base
Telecoms & Internet infrastructure
FDI enabling environment
FDI legislation (independent FDI)
FDI legislation (privatisation/infrastructure FDI)
Facilitation process
Political commitment
Incentives
Investment promotion
Institutional-Political environment
Economic instability (inflation, exchange rates, debt)
Policy certainty
Political interference, bureaucracy, and corruption
Justice system and intellectual property rights
Internal social tensions
Strong
Strong
Strong
Medium
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Weak
Medium
Strong
Weak
Medium
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Table 20 shows that Turkey’s key competitive weaknesses are associated with institutional-
political factors. Turkey performs worse than most of its competitors in terms of political
and economic stability and we identified inflation as a particularly significant obstacle for
inward investment. Other obstacles include lack of transparency, political interference, and
corruption, as well as internal social tensions (see SWOT analysis in the Appendix).
Political instability and the associated uncertain investment climate have prevented Turkey
from exploiting the potential of the customs union. The evidence strongly suggests that
FDI in Turkey has been primarily market seeking not efficiency seeking and the Turkey-
EU customs union has not led to a rapid growth in efficiency-seeking FDI.
§§§§§ As Bende-
                                                
§§§§§ Only in the last year have major companies began to adopt efficiency seeking strategies for
their Turkish operations, especially in the automotive industry. Renault awarded its first ever world
product mandate outside of France to its Turkish joint venture operation, and Ford and Fiat areLOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Nabende (1999: Ch.7) argues, the liberalisation of trade associated with regional integration
is unlikely to lead to increased FDI unless the political situation is stable and the
investment climate certain.
While we found Poland and the Czech Republic to also have an unfavourable political-
institutional environment, they have not suffered from the chronic inflation of Turkey, the
domestic and international security and human rights concerns, and they have had greater
stability in economic policy. Privatisation is a key example, with our research in this chapter
stressing the policy instability and slow pace of reform in Turkey, as well as lack of
international arbitration.
The uncertainty over investing in Turkey, and lack of information on what Turkey has to
offer has been compounded by an almost total lack of effective investment promotion.
Given these obstacles to attracting FDI, Turkey has not been able to compete successfully
with the CEECs for FDI, despite its very strong underlying competitive position.
4. The IMF Agreement and EU Enlargement
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter we evaluate how Turkey’s recent stand-by agreement with the IMF and EU
candidate status will influence the obstacles to FDI we identified in chapter three. We also
look in detail at how EU enlargement as whole will affect Turkey’s competitive position as
an investment location.
4.2. The IMF agreement
Turkish politicians are expecting the three-year $4 billion IMF stand-by agreement to make
Turkey a significant centre of gravity for foreign capital. Turkish Economic Minister, Recep
Onal, anticipates that once the government’s determination over structural transformation
is clearly understood and early positive results of the disinflation program are revealed,
there will be a major leap in foreign capital flows (Xinhua News Agency, 2000).
At the cornerstone of the $4 billion IMF agreement is completing the privatisation of all
state economic enterprises by 2001 (EIU, 2000) and reducing inflation to single digits by
2002.
****** The programme has got off to a good start. During the first four months of
2000, Turkey sold off  $5.3 billion in state companies and operating licenses, exceeding the
total privatisation of the past 17 years (KEW 12-18 Apr 2000). Inflation is also falling,
although not by enough to reduce inflation to the forecast 25% by the end of 2000. There
is widespread support and commitment for structural reform – in large part because it is
                                                                                                                                              
also producing new models for the world market solely in Turkey. Toyota and Hyundai appear to
be in the process of re-organising their Turkish ventures as major export platforms for the EMEA
market. The IMF agreement and prospects of EU membership were likely to be decisive in these
new investment decisions.
****** The IMF agreement also involved new legislation that allows foreign investors to seek
international arbitration in disputes over contracts involving the state. This has been one of the
biggest obstacles to financing much needed energy and other infrastructure projects, and should
encourage FDI inflows (EIU, 1999).TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
29
seen as Turkey’s last chance to become a normally functioning market economy and to join
the EU.
In chapter two we argued that low levels of privatisation-related FDI was the major factor
explaining Turkey’s under-performance in attracting FDI relative to the CEECs taken as
group, and in chapter three we found that chronic inflation has been a major obstacle to
competing for inward investment. The structural policies being implemented under the
auspices of the IMF, if successful, are likely to remove two of the major obstacles to FDI.
The interdependent relationship between privatisation, inflation and FDI is likely to lead
additional multiplier effects on FDI in Turkey. Under the IMF agreement, privatisation
receipts are being used to repay state debt, in order to reduce inflation. Privatisation itself
will lead to direct FDI inflows as foreign investors take strategic stakes in state owned
enterprises and the reduction in inflation will greatly improve the economic environment
for investors, attracting additional independent FDI. The reduction in debt will also
improve Turkey’s credit ratings and the risk premium attached to investing in Turkey.
Furthermore, “a strong privatisation programme sends an important signal to the investor
community, that the government is willing to support private sector development and
remove impediments and restrictions on foreign involvement” (IFC, 1997: 43), which has a
strong effect on the decision making process of foreign investors (Sader, 1995: V). This is
the experience of countries like Hungary (Kaminski and Riboud, 1999) and in Poland the
reduction in debt following deals with international creditors on external debt and
financing also appears to have led to a sharp increase in FDI due to a change in
perceptions (Orlowski and Szczepanska-Maciejuk, 1998).
If the Turkish government shows the necessary political commitment to relinquish
strategic state control in a large number of state-owned enterprises,
†††††† then the IMF
programme should lay the foundations for a rapid increase in FDI if the government uses
this opportunity to promote wider FDI in Turkey.
4.3. EU enlargement
According to the EIU (2000), “Turkey’s acceptance as an EU candidate should boost
confidence, and will attract investment.” However, only around 10% of our interview
respondents saw the prospect of EU membership as one of Turkey’s key strengths as an
FDI location, while almost 30% of respondents cited not joining the EU as a key threat to
Turkey’s position (see SWOT analysis in appendix). As with creating a favourable FDI
enabling and political-institutional environment, membership of the EU appears to be a
pre-condition rather than an advantage if Turkey is to successfully compete for inward
investment.
There are two key reasons why Turkey needs to join the EU as soon as possible if it is to
become a centre of gravity for inward investment. First, the CEECs that join the EU first
are likely to further divert FDI away from Turkey. Second, Turkish products cannot
compete on a level playing field unless Turkey is a member of the EU or Single European
Market.
                                                
†††††† This must be through a fair and transparent process, not lengthened by bureaucratic
procedures and indecisiveness (Megyery and Sader, 1997).LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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4.3.1.The impact of the CEECs joining the EU before Turkey
According to Eurostat (1997: 39), “it is clear that European companies have a tendency to
respond to globalisation pressures by enhancing the division of labour through FDI within
the EU rather than to third countries.” Membership of the EU therefore makes a country
more attractive for FDI from other EU countries. This argument has empirical support in
the case of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. For example, Thomsen and Woolcock (1993) show
that Ireland’s share of US FDI doubled in first five years following membership and after
Portugal joined the EC in 1986, FDI doubled every year 1987-1989. Spain experienced a
similar increase in FDI following membership.
Membership of the EU brings access to markets, greater policy certainty, increased growth
prospects and stability, access to structural funds, and membership of the Single European
Market and the Euro, as well as a change in perceptions with the new member now
psychologically part of “Europe.”
Brenton (1999) demonstrates that the candidate countries themselves are their own
principal competitors. Together with the EU being the most important export market for
all of the candidate countries, “the impact of the next enlargement may be felt most heavily
in those CEECs not included and in Mediterranean countries, such as Turkey” (Brenton,
1999: 75).
JETRO (2000) states that “leading US and European firms in fields such as auto/auto
parts, finance, communications, aviation and energy are rushing to enhance their market
position in the region, and FDI flows are expected to continue to grow in 2000.” But this is
only the case in countries where membership of the EU is a “distinct possibility.” Hence,
Kaminski and Riboud (1999) and Orlowski and Szczepanska-Maciejuk (1998) argue that
the prospects of EU membership have already increased FDI in Hungary and Poland.
Differentiating between fast- and slow-track candidates in accession is therefore likely to
divert trade and investment away from Turkey and those CEECs that are less advanced in
their negotiations. The slow track countries will also be disadvantaged from their exclusion
from structural funds that can be used to improve infrastructure and the business
environment in the first wave members (Brenton, 1999).
In our interviews, three-quarters of respondents thought that the prospects of the CEECs
joining the EU before Turkey will have at least a “significant” impact on FDI in Turkey,
while one-third of respondents thought that joining the EU was important “to a great
extent” for attracting FDI to Turkey. Turkey is going to find it harder to compete for FDI
as it is excluded from the first wave of new members.
4.3.2. The impact of Turkey not being a member of the Single Market
While Turkey has a customs union with the EU, our research strongly suggests that this is
not a substitute for being a member of Single European Market when it comes to attracting
FDI. In our interviews, 45% of respondents thought that EU membership will have a
major  impact on access to markets, perceptions and image, and macro-economic stability
in Turkey.TURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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The frequency which respondents cited access to markets is surprising, given the customs
union between Turkey and the EU. In fact, only one respondent said that membership of
the EU would not lead to greater access to markets because of the pre-existing customs
union. There are two key reasons why the customs union is not a substitute for joining the
EU and the Single European Market:
•  The customs union has quotas: Textiles are subject to quotas and the customs union
excludes agriculture. Textiles are Turkey’s main export sector and Turkey is the largest
exporter to the EU. Turkey’s textiles industry currently enjoys less protection than the
EU’s (EIU, 2000: 44).
‡‡‡‡‡‡ In agriculture, Turkey is one of the few countries in the
world that is self-sufficient, and Turkey is the world’s biggest producer of several
commodities. The GAP project will dramatically increase Turkey’s agriculture output,
but Turkey will face quota restrictions when exporting to the EU.
•  The customs union has not prevented the use non-tariff barriers (NTBs). This is
a significant obstacle to Turkey competing in the EU in goods where it has a
comparative advantage. According to Balasubramanyam (1996: 128), Turkey is reported
to be cited in more anti-dumping cases by the EU than most other countries. A case in
point is the European Commission’s “Notice of initiation of anti-dumping
proceedings” lodged in June 2000 concerning colour television receivers originating in
or exported from Turkey – a sector which has been one of the major success stories of
the customs union for Turkey.
§§§§§§ The EU also applies local content requirements
against Turkey. When Turkey was negotiating to join the customs union, the EC
endorsed the view that Japanese transplants in Turkey do not have Turkey as their
country of origin and requested Turkey not to export Japanese cars (Duna and Kutay,
1996: 176-177). In the end, Japanese automotive companies producing in Turkey had
to have a 60% EU local content for cars to be exported to the EU
The EU similarly applies NTBs to the CEECs. For example, in 1995 2% of Polish imports
to the EU were subject to anti-dumping duties or investigation (CEPS, 1998: 6). The
OECD (1995) estimates that the costs of responding to anti-dumping duties in the CEECs
are up to 10% of a firm’s annual export revenues (cited in CEPS, 1998: 6). Association
agreements with the CEECs also require 60% domestic content for printed circuit boards
and automotive sectors products to enter the EU (Moran, 1999: 79). This has meant that
auto plants in the CEECs have had to import high cost EU steel preventing utilisation of
Hungarian, Polish or Turkish steel (Moran, 1999: 107-8).
Anti-dumping duties and rules of origin have therefore skewed “trade and investment
patterns away from what international comparative advantage would otherwise predict”
(Moran, 1999: 8). We recommend that Turkey and second wave applicants meet the
requirements and negotiate to gain membership of the Single European Market, or at least
                                                
‡‡‡‡‡‡ In July 2000 the EU decided to lift quotas imposed on Turkish textile imports between 2002
and 2005.
§§§§§§ Turkey’s major producer, Vestel, increased its sales by 1000% between 1994 and 1998 and
increased its share of the highly competitive European television market from less than 1% to 13%.
White goods is another major success story: one in ten domestic appliances sold in the UK are
made in Turkey, primarily by Arcelik.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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provisions to avoid anti-dumping duties. This will become all the more urgent when the
first wave of CEECs join the EU. As Brenton (1999) points out, the new members may
themselves instigate anti-dumping duties against Turkey and other candidate countries.
4.4. Conclusion and policy recommendations
Our discussion of the IMF agreement and EU enlargement suggests that while Turkey is
already addressing some of the key obstacles to inward investment, further action is
urgently needed.
The $4 billion IMF agreement, if successful, will lead to privatisation and foreign
involvement in many of Turkey strategic assets, which should send a positive message to
other potential investors that Turkey is entering into a new era of greater policy certainty
and less political interference in business. Equally as important is the dis-inflation aspect of
the IMF agreement. Reducing inflation to single digit levels is a crucial pre-condition for
attracting FDI.
While our research has found EU membership to be vital to Turkey’s competitive position
as an inward investment location, candidate status has also led to a greater scrutiny of
Turkey’s internal affairs, highlighting issues such as human rights, regional inequalities, and
the conflict in the South East. This is likely to have a negative impact on FDI in the short
term, but should provide a powerful impetus for change in the longer term. Turkey’s
candidate status also generates greater comparison with the CEECs. While our empirical
research in chapter two demonstrated Turkey’s underlying economic competitive strength,
much of the comparison between Turkey and the EU is likely to continue to be along the
political dimension. At present, with all the candidate countries except Turkey having met
the Copenhagen criteria for starting EU accession negotiations, there is definitely a
perception that Turkey will be the last to join the EU.
It is almost certain that the leading CEECs will join the EU before Turkey, and our
research has found that this will have a major impact on Turkey’s ability to compete for
FDI. In fact, we found that not joining the EU and competition from the CEECs were two
of the key threats facing Turkey position for attracting FDI (see SWOT analysis in
appendix). Other research has also shown that competition within the region for inward
investment is intensifying (Oman, 2000; JETRO, 2000; Balasubramanyam, 1996).
Membership of the EU is vital for access to markets and funding, economic growth and
stability, political stability, policy convergence, and for changing perceptions. We
recommend that Turkey takes the necessary steps to meet the Copenhagen criteria as
quickly as possible and negotiates for membership of the Single European Market to
ensure a level playing field with the leading CEECs that join the EU first.
Turkey offers huge opportunities for inward investors, not least because of its large,
dynamic economy, quality labour force, and position at the centre of a growing $1.5 trillion
dollar regional economy. The IMF agreement and EU membership promise to remove
many of the obstacles to inward investment in Turkey, in particular relating to minimal
privatisation, chronic inflation, and obstacles to EU market access.
However, to benefit from its underlying strength as a location for FDI our research
suggests that Turkey needs to develop far more effective investment promotion to respondTURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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to poor image and brand awareness and lack of information on what Turkey has to
offer.
******* As one of our interview respondents commented:  “If Turkey does not get its
act together and offer a more coherent package and better promotion it will miss real
opportunities.”
Turkey’s leading competitors for inward investment are developing increasingly
sophisticated investment promotion strategies, which are not only helping them to “win”
new FDI but are also creating dynamic benefits for their economies. For example,
CzechInvest, the investment agency for the Czech Republic, has quickly established high
brand awareness and a reputation as a professional agency. The agency has a clear targeted
strategy and is investing in initiatives to link foreign investors with domestic suppliers and
to promote the upgrading for foreign facilities over time. We therefore recommend a
detailed review of the organisation and strategy of investment promotion in Turkey.
†††††††
Table 21 summarises our key policy recommendations for increasing FDI in Turkey and
maximising the benefits for Turkey’s economic development.
                                                
******* As the SWOT analysis in the Appendix indicates, Turkey also needs to broker better political
and economic ties with neighbouring countries if it is to emerge as a major regional production and
financial centre.
††††††† For a detailed discussion of investment promotion see Loewendahl (2000); Young et al
(1994); Wint (1993) and Wells and Wint (1991). See Loewendahl (2001) and Spar (1998) for how
agencies facilitate FDI projects.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Table 21: Policy recommendations for increasing FDI in Turkey
Short term (1 year) Medium term (2-4 years) Long term (5-10 years)
Economic factors
•  Reduce inflation to single
digits
•  Strategy of for developing
IT&T infrastructure
•  Strategy for brining education
to EU levels
•  Strategy for supporting R&D
and innovation
Enabling Environment
•  Complete major privatisation
•  Review of all investment
promotion activities and
develop a new strategy
•  Secure funding for new
investment promotion
activities
Political-Institutional factors
•  Faster progress in meeting the
Copenhagen criteria so EU
accession negotiations can
begin
•  Complete reforms needed to
join the Single Market,
especially competition law
•  Develop strategy to deal with
institutional and political
obstacles to FDI (e.g.
bureaucracy, attitudes)
Economic factors
•  Ensure Turkey has a world
class IT&T infrastructure
•  Increase education levels for
all segments of society
•  Expand internet availability to
all of population
•  Support for innovation,
entrepreneurs and SMEs
•  Maintain low inflation
Enabling Environment
•  Establish a new or
expanded investment
promotion agency
•  Cut investment incentives
•  Integrate investment
promotion with economic
development policy
•  Develop a network of
regional agencies for FDI
and economic
development
Political-Institutional factors
•  Remove obstacles to FDI
(attitudes, corruption,
judiciary, bureaucracy, etc)
•  Develop high quality
intellectual property rights
•  Strategy for accessing and
using EU structural funds
Economic factors
•  Support transition to a
knowledge-based economy
Enabling Environment
•  Develop a recognised brand
image of Turkey, which
differentiates Turkey’s ‘offer’
to investors at the national
and regional levels
•  Develop strong partnership
between regions in Turkey
and other EU regions for
attracting FDI and for
economic development
•  New promotion campaign for
a Turkey ‘in’ the EU
•  Promote Turkey as a regional
economic centre for Southern
European, Balkans, Central
Asia, Middle East and North
Africa for strategic activities
Political-Institutional factors
•  Join European Union
•  Aim for a marked
improvement in regional
relations, especially with
middle east
With the link between efficiency, market and asset seeking FDI increasing in importance in
corporate location strategies, Turkey will continue to lose major opportunities to attract
inward investment unless it takes urgent steps to reform its political-institutional
environment and improve its investment promotion activities and image. While Turkey has
one of the most dynamic markets in Europe for “new economy” activities, Turkey must
also develop a strategy to increase its location advantages for asset-seeking FDI, through
much greater support for its technological infrastructure and continued progress in its
telecommunications and Internet infrastructure.
Attracting FDI cannot be considered in isolation from broader economic and political
developments in Turkey. Economic stability, policy certainty and EU membership are pre-
conditions for attracting significant investment into Turkey, but effective investment
promotion and product development policies to develop the technological and human
infrastructure are vital to successfully compete for and benefit from inward investment in
the medium to long term.LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Appendix
SWOT Analysis
A SWOT analysis evaluates the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing an
organisation or a location. It can be used to facilitate strategy development. The below
figures outline a SWOT analysis for Turkey as an investment location, based on our
interview results. We evaluate the sectoral opportunities.
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 0
Political instability
Macro-economic instability
Lack of promotion and image
Legislation and bureaucracy
Human rights
Kurdish issue
Key weaknesses of Turkey as an investment location
(% of respondents citing factor)
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 0
Market size
Geographical location
Skilled & educated workforce
Low costs
Quality of local business
Proximity to EU and customs union
Good infrastructure
FDI enabling environment
Large, flexible workforce
Prospects of EU membership
Key strengths of Turkey as an investment location
(% of respondents citing factor)
%
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
EU accession
Better promotion
Political stability
Economic stability
Regional stability
Low cost advantage
New legislation and regulations
Energy gateway
Economic growth
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 0
Political instability
Macroeconomic instability
Not join EU
Competition from CEECs
Poor image and promotion
Regional instability
No progress on legisation and regulation
Kurdish issue/human rights
Key opportunities for increasing FDI in Turkey
(% of respondents citing factors)
Key threats for Turkey’s position as inward investment
location (% of respondents citing factor)
%LOEWENDAHL & ERTUGAL-LOEWENDAHL
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Key sectors in which Turkey is in a strong competitive
position to attract FDI (% of respondents citing factor)
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 0
Manufacturing
Tourism
Energy
Food
Finance
Telecoms
IT and R&D
AgricultureTURKEY’S PERFORMANCE IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
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